Research Paper#Bayesian Persuasion, Information Economics, Game Theory🔬 ResearchAnalyzed: Jan 3, 2026 18:53
Axiomatic Foundations of Bayesian Persuasion
Published:Dec 29, 2025 12:10
•1 min read
•ArXiv
Analysis
This paper explores the theoretical underpinnings of Bayesian persuasion, a framework where a principal strategically influences an agent's decisions by providing information. The core contribution lies in developing axiomatic models and an elicitation method to understand the principal's information acquisition costs, even when they actively manage the agent's biases. This is significant because it provides a way to analyze and potentially predict how individuals or organizations will strategically share information to influence others.
Key Takeaways
- •Develops axiomatic foundations for Bayesian persuasion.
- •Introduces novel models where the principal can steer the agent's bias.
- •Provides an elicitation method to determine the principal's information acquisition costs.
- •Method uses only observable menu-choice data.
Reference
“The paper provides an elicitation method using only observable menu-choice data of the principal, which shows how to construct the principal's subjective costs of acquiring information even when he anticipates managing the agent's bias.”