Research Paper#Network Science, Information Economics, Game Theory🔬 ResearchAnalyzed: Jan 3, 2026 19:22
Reputation and Disclosure in Dynamic Networks
Published:Dec 28, 2025 16:09
•1 min read
•ArXiv
Analysis
This paper investigates how reputation and information disclosure interact in dynamic networks, focusing on intermediaries with biases and career concerns. It models how these intermediaries choose to disclose information, considering the timing and frequency of disclosure opportunities. The core contribution is understanding how dynamic incentives, driven by reputational stakes, can overcome biases and ensure eventual information transmission. The paper also analyzes network design and formation, providing insights into optimal network structures for information flow.
Key Takeaways
- •Dynamic incentives, driven by reputational stakes, can overcome biases and ensure information transmission.
- •Network design impacts information flow; bias-monotone trees sustain disclosure.
- •Optimal network design can involve parallel routes for high-reputation intermediaries.
- •Link formation can be inefficient due to externalities on reputational assets.
Reference
“Dynamic incentives rule out persistent suppression and guarantee eventual transmission of all verifiable evidence along the path, even when bias reversals block static unraveling.”