Research Paper#Cryptography, Post-Quantum Security, Side-Channel Attacks🔬 ResearchAnalyzed: Jan 4, 2026 00:00
Statistical Risk Model for Timing Variability in Post-Quantum Cryptography
Published:Dec 26, 2025 03:12
•1 min read
•ArXiv
Analysis
This paper addresses a critical security concern in post-quantum cryptography: timing side-channel attacks. It proposes a statistical model to assess the risk of timing leakage in lattice-based schemes, which are vulnerable due to their complex arithmetic and control flow. The research is important because it provides a method to evaluate and compare the security of different lattice-based Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (KEMs) early in the design phase, before platform-specific validation. This allows for proactive security improvements.
Key Takeaways
- •Proposes a statistical risk model for timing side-channel attacks in lattice-based post-quantum cryptography.
- •Evaluates timing leakage under different execution conditions (idle, jitter, loaded).
- •Identifies cache-index and branch-style leakage as high-risk signals.
- •Provides a method for early-stage security comparison of lattice-based KEMs.
Reference
“The paper finds that idle conditions generally have the best distinguishability, while jitter and loaded conditions erode distinguishability. Cache-index and branch-style leakage tends to give the highest risk signals.”